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Based on the challenges of the new global security environment, Hungary 
conducted a strategic Defense Review, which served as the basis of a reform of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces. One of the consequences of this reform is that the Hungarian 
Government has directed the establishment of a Special Forces group within the HDF. 
The government based this decision on an examination of the current security 
environment, likely threats, and its responsibilities as a member of NATO and the 
European Union.  
Recent experience has shown that in the GWOT one of the most important 
requirements is information dominance. Information gathered by human intelligence 
becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare. The role of the SOF in the 
collection of important information in theater requires a robust intelligence architecture at 
the unit level. The final goal should be the complete integration of SOF-based 
intelligence into the national intelligence community, both as an information provider and 
as an information user. The aim of this thesis is to address the importance of the proper 
intelligence structure within the Hungarian SF unit, especially in the current global 
security environment, as well as its cooperation with other intelligence agencies in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
As part of defense reform in Hungary, the transformation of its Armed Forces has 
begun. One of the consequences of this transformation is that the Hungarian Government 
has directed the establishment of a Special Forces group within the Hungarian Defense 
Forces (HDF). The government based this decision on an examination of the current 
security environment, likely threats, and its responsibilities as a member of NATO and 
the European Union. A working group was set up with the responsibility to analyze the 
basic principles of Special Forces in the context of Hungary’s military capabilities. The 
author of this thesis has direct contact with the working group, and the group asked the 
author to conduct a complete study on the intelligence architecture in a Special Forces 
unit, based on the U.S. Army Special Forces model. The aim of this thesis is to address 
the importance of the proper intelligence structure in an SF unit, especially in the current 
global security environment, as well as its cooperation with other intelligence agencies in 
the global war on terrorism (GWOT). 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the current global security environment, especially after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, the possibility of a major war is very low. However, small-scale wars, 
insurgencies, and the global war on terror (GWOT) make the environment far less stable 
than it was during the Cold War. To identify the required military capabilities and the 
size and structure of the armed forces, a threat assessment is necessary. Based on the 
challenges of the new global security environment, Hungary conducted a strategic 
Defense Review1, which served as the basis of a reform of the HDF. The most important 
conclusion of the National Security Strategy2 is that Hungary does not expect any direct 
attack by conventional means on the country in the next decade. However, other regional 
 
1 The Defense Review itself is classified; however, a summary of the review was published, which 
examine the review and its result. Juhasz, Ferenc, Minister of Defense, Shaping an Armed Forces for the 
21st Century,  – retrieved August 2004 from 
http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0
2 The Hungarian National Security Strategy was retrieved October 2004 from 
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Biztonsagpolitika/
 2
                                                
and global threats have increased rapidly in the past few years. The National Security 
Strategy clearly addressed the expectations from the HDF and defined the necessity of a 
specialized National Military Strategy3. This main concern is also outlined in Hungary’s 
constitution - defense of the native land has absolute priority. 
Other missions, assigned to the HDF, can include the contribution to the 
collective defense of NATO and other alliances, participation in Stability and Security 
Operations (SASOs), and support of the GWOT. Based on the direction of the National 
Security Strategy, a draft of the National Military Strategy has already been circulated in 
the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Several paragraphs of the National Military Strategy are 
directly related to the Special Forces capabilities. With the establishment of the SOF 
capability, the most important requirement is the fulfillment of NATO and the European 
Union requirements, as well as satisfying national needs. The relevant documents, 
regarding these requirements, are the NATO Special Operations Policy and the Allied 
Joint Doctrines. These documents clearly identify the necessary capabilities for Special 
Operation Forces such as Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR), Direct Action 
(DA), and Military Assistance (MA). These tasks, however, all require a properly 
developed intelligence architecture, not only at the unit level, but also at the national 
level. The purpose of intelligence in Special Operations is “assessing areas of interest 
ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly 
and enemy forces. SF must perform intelligence activities ranging from developing 
information critical to planning and conducting operations or sustaining and protecting 
themselves and the UW [unconventional warfare] forces, to assessing the capabilities and 
intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.”4  
The U.S. model for the organization of Army SF units has been proven successful 
in combat in Colombia, Philippines, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Army Special Operations 
Forces, also known as the ‘Green Berets’ (ARSOF), intelligence architecture is a mature 
system that is also technologically advanced. It has also been tested in combat in many 
 
3 The National Military Strategy is a classified document, yet the National Security Strategy clearly 
gives its framework.  
4 FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations Manual, Chapter II. pp 9 under intelligence activities, 
retrieved August 2004 from http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/31_Series_Collection_1.html  
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conflicts around the world. Hungary, as a member of NATO, implements many NATO 
standards that are based on U.S. organizations and operating procedures. Therefore, 
emulation of the U.S. SF intelligence architecture, at the SOF unit level, will support not 
only a more valuable contribution to NATO, but will also help to foster better co-
operation with the United States. Furthermore, the United States is willing to help 
Hungary’s effort to establish SOF capability. This support package consists of finances, 
equipment, and human resources. 
Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that in the GWOT one of 
the most important requirements is information dominance. Information gathered by 
human intelligence becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare, because 
photographic reconnaissance or electronic surveillance is less effective than against a 
conventional enemy. The role of the SOF in the collection of important information in 
theater requires a robust intelligence architecture at the unit level. However, to be 
effective, SOF intelligence must feed into a National level intelligence organization. The 
final goal should be the complete integration of SOF-based intelligence into the national 
intelligence community, both as an information provider and as an information user. To 
understand the importance of the co-operation between SOF and a National security 
service, it is worth examining the U.S. example, as co-operation between ARSOF and 
CIA paramilitary units has become a model for the GWOT. The “Afghan Model”, for 
example, in which U.S. special operations forces served in theater alongside CIA units, is 
seen by many as a template for SOF-intelligence co-operation.5 The role of SOF in 
Afghanistan was to provide targeting information for precision weapons, allowing such 
weapons to reach dispersed, concealed opponents; training; leading indigenous forces; 
providing intelligence about the enemy through locals; and conducting man-hunting 
using the gathered information. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The author has developed this thesis by integrating the issues that have been 
mentioned above. Chapter II is dedicated to the current security policy in Hungary with 
 
5 Biddle, Stephen. Afghanistan and the Future Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, 
Foreword pp. iv the document is available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcom.htm October 
2004 
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an examination of the National Security Strategy, security advantages, and obligations as 
a member of NATO and the European Union (EU), and the role of Hungary in the 
GWOT. This chapter will argue that the current security situation and the future threats to 
Hungary have enhanced the importance of SOF capability to the Hungarian and European 
defense. 
In Chapter III, the author examines the intelligence architecture of U.S. ARSOF. 
The purpose of the examination is two-fold. First, it will help to explain the 
responsibilities and tasks at different operational levels. Second, it will suggest 
modification of the U.S. ARSOF model to fit into Hungary’s national characteristics and 
highlight important issues that should be addressed in order to achieve the integration of 
intelligence and SOF operations. 
Chapter IV is the actual recommendation for the intelligence component. The 
author makes his recommendations based on the U.S. experience, adjusted for the 
Hungarian security environment and requirements of the international community. This is 
a possible solution, based on Hungary’s efforts within the framework of NATO, the 
European Union, and other bi and multi-lateral agreements. Furthermore, the author 
describes the current intelligence agencies in Hungary and their role in the country’s 
internal security and foreign policy, because the final goal is to integrate the SOF 
intelligence structure into the National level intelligence cycle. 
The conclusion summarizes and highlights again the most important issues. 
Although there are many, other decisions waiting to be clarified about the Hungarian 
SOF unit, given the current international security situation, the creation of a proper 
intelligence architecture within SOF should be paramount. The author hopes this thesis 
will be helpful for the working group in Hungary, and will provide a solid basis for the 






                                                
II. HUNGARY’S CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, 
FUTURE THREATS AND CHALLENGES, AND PERSPECTIVES 
WITHIN NATO AND EU REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
SOF CAPABILITY 
When the hour of crisis comes, remember that forty selected men can 
shake the world. 
Yasotay (Mongol warlord) 
A. HUNGARY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
In this chapter, the author examines Hungary’s current security situation based on 
its NATO membership and as a member of the European Union, as well as the threat 
assessment according to the Hungarian National Security Strategy and Hungarian 
Military Strategy. The author’s main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the 
importance of having a Special Forces capability following the similar efforts made by 
NATO and the European Union, whereas Hungary, as a sovereign state, has obligations 
as well. 
Hungary, as a member of the European Union and NATO, believes that the new 
security challenges can be most effectively managed through international cooperation. 
Thus, the roles of the EU and NATO have become increasingly more important in 
planning Hungary’s defense posture. “Hungary’s membership in the European Union and 
NATO entails both obligations to adapt and adjust itself and the opportunity of 
participating in decision-making and common action.”6 As support for this line of 
reasoning, the author will examine how well the establishment of a Special Forces 
capability in Hungary can fit into the goals and requirements of the NATO and European 
Union.  
B. HUNGARY’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The transformation after 1989, when Hungary changed its regime, is reflected 
best by the new National Security Strategy, which was adopted on March 31, 2004, and 
then took effect on April 15, 2004. The National Security Strategy of Hungary builds on 
 
6 Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter II (Security environment)  
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and around the basic principles of the country’s security and defense policy. In addition, 
both of these documents line up with NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept7 and European 
Security Strategy8, including the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)9. The 
European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003 by the European Union. 
The Hungarian National Security Strategy defines and analyzes the country’s 
security environment, risk factors, challenges, and tasks that have an impact on the 
national security interests in the international political arena of the 21st century. The 
document identifies Hungary’s national security values and interests in ten points. 
Among these, the fourth and fifth points stress the importance of the European Union and 
NATO to Hungary’s prosperity and security. As a member country in both organizations, 
Hungary intends to nurture and preserve these alliances. Point No.9 suggests that 
Hungary’s interest is to keep a “durable stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, a 
comprehensive settlement of conflicts in the region and the suppression of threats to the 
security of the region, in particular terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.”10 Against terrorism, Hungary believes that the only effective response is 
achievable within a framework of international cooperation. Thus, the role of the 
international organizations such as NATO and the European Union is vital. In the context 
of the thesis, however, the author will highlight only those issues from the National 
Security Strategy that are related to the establishment of the Special Forces capability in 
Hungary or which have an impact on it. In addition, European Union and NATO 
strategies will be viewed selectively as they relate to the basic argument of the thesis, 
which is to emphasize the importance of the intelligence architecture within Special 
Operations Forces, to include the values of having such a unit established within the near 
future in Hungary. 
 
7 NATO 1999 Strategic Concept is available at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042450.htm 
retrieved January 2005 
8 The European Security Strategy is available at http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf retrieved 
January 2005 
9 The European Union’s Security and Defense Policy is available at http://www.iss-
eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf retrieved January 2005 
10 Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter I (Interests and values) 
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C. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE ON HUNGARY’S SECURITY 
POLICY 
Since the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy constitutes the 
framework of Hungary’s National Security Strategy, the author will examine the 
European Union’s efforts to establish an effective policy and strategy to deal with the 
current security challenges. Although for members of the European Union, NATO 
remains the basis of the collective defense, the European Security Strategy claims that 
“no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own…Europe should 
be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world.”11 The war on terror indicates that the traditional concept of self-defense, which 
was based on the threat of invasion, has changed. These new threats are more diverse, 
dynamic, less visible, and less predictable and require the first line of defense to be 
abroad. 
European forces have already been deployed abroad; they represent the European 
Union, for example, in Afghanistan, East Timor, the Balkans, and in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Among the key threats, terrorism has top priority. “Europe is both a 
target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been 
attacked. Logical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, 
Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.”12 This new 
wave of terrorism is well resourced, and seeks to inflict massive casualties. The worst-
case scenario is a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. In this case, a 
small group could cause enormous damage. 
The military capabilities of the European Union were identified at the December 
1999 Helsinki Council meeting. The document, known as the Headline Goal, requires 
European Union members to be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, and the 
troops should be sustained for at least a year. 
These capabilities are to be used in support of Petersberg missions. The 
Petersberg Tasks presently include humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
 
11 European Security Strategy, Introduction pp 3  
12 European Security Strategy, Chapter I pp 5 
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peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking (referred to as ‘peace enforcement’ in some 
contexts)…The self-sustaining element is envisioned to include the 
command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics, and air and naval 
assets required to carry out the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks.13
The missions for the forces are foreseen in the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). Among the variety of missions, two capabilities are deemed to be 
especially important: 
1. A single corps sized crisis management capability that, nonetheless, spares 
enough assets to conduct a small-scale operation such as a non-combatant 
evacuation operation (NEO). 
2. A long-term operation’s capability at less than maximum level of effort, while 
conducting another operation of a limited duration.14
The current situation is that the European Union is now capable of conducting 
some crisis-management operations. In May 2004, however, the EU defense ministers 
adopted a new plan. Known as ‘Headline Goal 2010’, it calls for the European Union to 
be able to respond by 2010 with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent 
approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty 
of the European Union.15  
The missions assigned to the EU military forces were taken from the Petesberg 
Declaration of June 1992. For this reason, the concept was outdated, and the European 
Convention has adopted a new definition. Article 40.1 of the draft Constitutional Treaty 
adopted by the European Convention (July 2003) states that: 
The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the 
common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an 
operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military. The Union may 
 
13 Lindstrom, Gustav. The Headline Goal, European Union Institute for Security Studies retrieved 
from http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf March 15, 2004. 
14 Ibid. Missions, pp1 
15 Lindstrom, Gustav. The Headline Goal, European Union Institute for Security Studies retrieved 
from http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf. March 15, 2004. Current operational status, pp 3, The author 
however, quoted from the Council of the European Union, doc. 6805/03 
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use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nation Charter. The performance of these tasks 
shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.16 
In addition, the 9/11 terror attack on the United States in 2001 further 
strengthened the cooperation among the Member States and between the European Union 
and the United States against terrorism. The Declaration of the European Council 
(Seville, June 2002), defined the contribution of Common Security and Foreign Policy 
(CSFP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the global war on terror 
(GWOT).17 One of the significant achievements of the European Council is the 
implementation of the Plan of Action to fight terrorism. Combating terrorism will 
continue to be a priority objective of the European Union and a key plank of its external 
relations policy. International cooperation remains the essential instrument of the GWOT. 
The Union will continue to maintain the closest possible coordination with the United 
States and other partners.18 Although the EU military missions support humanitarian and 
civilian missions, present challenges have caused Secretary-General, High Representative 
for the CFSP Javier Solana to remark, “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters 
early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention. We should think particularly of 
operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. This is an area where we 
could add particular value.”19 In addition, a review was conducted on the European 
Union’s ‘Niche’ capabilities.20 The support for developing SOF capabilities or improving 
the existing ones was emphasized. Encouraging the smaller member nations, to develop 
specialized capabilities within the European Union, such as SOF, mountain units, or any 
kind of scarce assets was recommended as well. The Military Balance Volume 104 in 
 
16 Ortega, Martin. Petersberg tasks, and missions of the European Force, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies retrieved January 2005 from http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf  
17 Ibid. The author quoted the Declaration of the European Council (Seville, June 2002) on the 
contribution of CSFP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism in his paper on the Petersberg tasks.  
18 Ibid. Key points of the Declaration of the European Council in Seville. 
19 Ortega. Quote from Javier Solana regarding the Declaration of the European Council in Seville, 
June 2002. 
20 These ‘Niche’ capabilities can be found in European Defense: A proposal for a White Paper, 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) for the European Union, Paris, retrieved May 2004 from http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/wp2004.pdf pp 119-120  
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2004 stated that “Defense Command Denmark has prepared a document that is intend to 
produce smaller forces for international missions…Netherlands is transforming its force 
structure to improve flexibility, operational effectiveness, and joint operations 
capability…Hungary is preparing an elite anti-terrorism unit.”21 Nonetheless, the Bonn 
International Center for Conversion published the Paper 33, which also stress the value 
of SOF units in the European Union. It states that: 
Special Forces are used for a range of operations where technological 
solutions also need to be combined with human resources…These forces 
can be used, for instance, to support effective engagement representing 
HUMINT on the ground…This is particular pertinent tot Europeans 
lacking more technological assets/capabilities for effective engagement 
and intelligence gathering…Special Forces rely on sensitive national 
intelligence, which members states are unwilling to pool or share because 
of jealously guarded sources and the risk of compromising such sources.22  
The last part of the statement is especially important for the context of this thesis and the 
author will further discuss in Chapter IV the possible problems of integrating the 
Hungarian SOF into the national level intelligence community. 
D. NATO AND ITS ROLE 
The GWOT and other security challenges have also prompted a transformation 
within NATO. At the NATO summit in Istanbul, on June 28-29, 2004, the decision was 
made to establish “more capable, usable, and responsive forces in support of NATO’s 
new missions; and strengthening cooperation with partners, especially in beyond the 
Euro-Atlantic area.”23 NATO missions currently exist all over the world in support of the 
GWOT. The most important are currently in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, 
NATO forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will remain until 
Afghanistan achieves a representative government and self-sustaining peace and 
 
21 International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance Volume 104 (2004) (provides a 
quantitative assessment of the world's military forces and their defense expenditure), retrieved February 
2005 from www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/milbal
22 Bonn International Center for Conversion, paper 33: Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force, Options 
for and Constraints on a European Defense Equipment Strategy, retrieved November 2004 from 
http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper33/paper33.pdf
23 NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide retrieved January 2005 from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/press-kit.htm  
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security.24 In Iraq NATO’s position has been slightly different. In the first phase of the 
war, NATO did not have a direct role in the international stabilization force within Iraq. 
“So far, it has been providing support to Poland, on the explicit request of this 
country…In addition to its support to Poland, NATO responded to a request made by 
Turkey, in February 2003, for defensive assistance from the Alliance in the event of a 
threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict in neighboring Iraq.”25 
This request was made after the Istanbul Summit. There was a meeting in Brussels on 9 
December 2004, when Foreign Ministers of the 26 NATO countries agreed to move 
ahead with expanding NATO’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as maintaining its 
commitment to the Balkans. “The Alliance currently is preparing to expand the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The so-called ‘phase 2’ 
expansion will see NATO deploying Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to the 
West of the country…Foreign Ministers also gave the formal go-ahead for the expansion 
of NATO’s training assistance to Iraq. The Alliance’s mission in Iraq will be now 
increased to around 300 personnel, including trainers and support staff, and will step up 
the ongoing training and mentoring of senior level Iraqi security forces.”26  
Since the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, 
2001, NATO member countries have continued to show a strong determination to play 
their part in the fight against terrorism following the attacks against the United States on 
September 11, 2001.27 The ISAF in Afghanistan, the Operation Active Endeavor, the 
security operations within the Athens Olympic Games, and the peacekeeping forces 
acting against terrorists in the Balkans, show the wide variety of tasks conducted by 
NATO in the GWOT. With special regards to the requests of the United States, NATO 
provided initial support for coalition operations against the Taliban regime in 
 
24 NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide retrieved December 2004 from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/press-kit.htm. Chapter IV. NATO in 
Afghanistan 
25 NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide retrieved December 2004 from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/press-kit.htm. Chapter V. NATO and Iraq 
26 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was interviewed after the meetings. Foreign 
Ministers agree on expanded NATO roles in Iraq, Afghanistan. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-
december/e1209c.htm – accessed December 30, 2004 
27 NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide – Action Against Terrorism 
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Afghanistan. Generally, this initial package included greater information sharing, 
increased security for the facilities of the United States and other allies on their territory, 
blanket over-flight rights, access to ports and airfields.28 Also, at the Prague Summit in 
November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted the so-called Prague 
Package, which defined the necessary steps to develop NATO in the GWOT. The 
package defined, for example, a new military concept for defense against terrorism, the 
adoption of a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), the adoption of measures in 
the field of weapons of mass destruction, the protection of civilian populations, missile 
defense, cyber-defense, and the co-operation with other international organizations. In 
addition to this package, the creation of the NATO Response Force, as well as other 
initiatives such as the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, was established. A ‘Capabilities 
Conference’ will be held in Lillehammer, in 15-17 June 2005 to discuss NATO’s SOF 
capabilities. This unique event will bring together NATO staffs, NATO agencies, 
commanders and a delegation from the alliance Special Operations Forces (SOF). The 
goal is a “Top to Bottom” review of important issues and capabilities.  
The Conference reflects the significant role that SOF play in shaping pre-
conflict environments as well as on the modern battlefield itself, and in 
post-conflict situations. It also reflects a determination to bring about 
meaningful transformation in the Alliance and demonstrate the “force 
multiplying” effects of cooperation and collaboration in complex and 
multi-dimensional projects. Finally, the Conference is necessary because 
of the important technological advances, which have been made in recent 
years directly affecting SOF.29
E. HUNGARY’S ROLE IN GWOT 
Hungary, as a member state, has had to adjust itself and find its place within this 
shifting security environment. It is also very important to be an active player in NATO’s 
and the European Union’s role in the GWOT. Hungary, as a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, enjoys the Alliance’s guarantees to protect the territorial 
 
28 Based on the request of the United States, NATO provided initial support for coalition operations 
against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in October 2001 and agreed on a package of eight measures. Information 
was retrieved from The Istanbul Summit Media Guide 
29 Lillehammer 2005, NATO SOF Capabilities Conference, 15-16-17 June 2005, Military Base, 
Joerstadmoen, this brochure was published at NATO graphics studio 
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integrity, political independence, and security of its member states.  Hungary has a 
fundamental interest in NATO remaining the primary forum of transatlantic security 
policy dialogue and co-operation, preserving its effectiveness by adapting to the changing 
security policy environment of the 21st century, and contributing to the extension of the 
zone of security and stability.30 Hungary, similar to other member states, makes a 
considerable effort to fulfill the political and military requirements of NATO. The 
transformation of the Armed Forces, the adaptation of NATO procedures, and the 
procurement of modern NATO compatible weapons, all serve one goal: enable Hungary 
to become a reliable partner, with valuable contributions to the Alliance. To fulfill its 
contribution requirement, Hungary participates in ISAF in Afghanistan and is present in 
Iraq. The Hungarian contribution to the war in Iraq started in August 2003, when troops 
arrived as a result of a bilateral agreement between Budapest and Washington. A 
transportation battalion consisting of 292 people has been working as part of the 
Multinational Division Central South (MNDCS). Seven officers were assigned to the 
MNDCS staff, and one person worked for the CJTF-7. This mission was completed in 
December 2004. With the increased role of NATO however, Hungary will participate in 
the NATO Training Mission with a contingent of 150 personnel. This mission will 
consist of force protection, the training of the Iraqi Army, and staff work.31
Regarding the European Union’s effort to become a significant factor within the 
international security arena, the Hungarian National Security Strategy defined a clear 
course for the country.32 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU 
provides the base framework of Hungarian foreign policy.  
The objective of the Republic of Hungary as a Member State is to have an 
effective and strong EU, which is capable to act on the international scene 
as well, where the equality of rights and the principle of solidarity between 
Member States are respected, and where the community method 
strengthens with the institutional balance being preserved…Hungary takes 
 
30 Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter I (Interests and values) 
31 The information was retrieved December 2004 from 
http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=19196&next=0&archiv=1&next=0   
32 The European Security Strategy defined the role of the EU in the building of global security. The 
CFSP of the EU gives a framework for the Hungarian foreign policy. 
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an active part in the realization of the European Security and Defense 
Policy and in the implementation of military and civilian crisis 
management operation.33  
This thesis supports the author’s belief that Special Operations Forces capability 
could make a very good contribution to the ESDP and other security building efforts, 
especially in fighting terrorism. Equally important is that these organizations should have 
a structured and proper intelligence architecture, which is also compatible with other 
NATO and EU forces. Due to the wide variety of tasks that Special Force can cover, SOF 
capability could prove valuable to solidify Hungary’s place in both alliances. The budget 
and the size of the Hungarian military put a limit on the amount of the country’s 
contribution to certain missions. For this reason, small but specialized units could be very 
useful and valuable to missions in the GWOT, and enhance Hungary’s stature at little 
cost. 
Special Forces capability could be used effectively in a wide range of strategic 
and tactical operations. However, these new security challenges require information 
dominance and that is possible only through effective intelligence architecture. Although, 
the primary purpose of this thesis is to recommend intelligence architecture for the SOF 
of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), the co-operation between the SOF and the 
national intelligence community is also very important, especially because of the new 
security threat.  
Hungary, as a member in NATO and the EU, has advantages as well as 
obligations towards these security organizations. The new and dramatically changed 
security environment has a huge impact on these institutions, and as an active member, 
on Hungary as well. The transformation of NATO and the EU has also influenced 
Hungary. The need to have Special Forces capability is clearly defined. Yet, an effective 
intelligence architecture within SOF is equally important, because the current threat 
requires information dominance most of all. Although, international cooperation and 
coordination is important to achieve an effective response to the terrorist threat, an 
extended cooperation between the National Security Services in Hungary and the 
 
33 Hungarian National Security Strategy. III.1.2 The European Union 
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Military, including the SOF, is also a required step toward success. In the next chapter, 
the author will examine the U.S. ARSOF intelligence model in order to better understand 
the requirements that make it possible to emulate the system and adjust it to the 





























































                                                
III. THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE WITHIN U.S. 
ARSOF 
There is another type of warfare – new in its intensity, ancient in its origin 
– war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush 
instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory 
by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on 
unrest. 
President John F. Kennedy, West Point, New York, 1962 
A. NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES  
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War reached its end. At the same 
time our security environment also changed entirely. Today, leading defense planners and 
strategists say that international terrorists, insurgencies, and regional conflicts are going 
to threaten our way of life for the next two decades. Long gone are the days when a linear 
battlefield could be identified in doctrinal graphics and map icons as rigid, defined and 
certain. This school of thought kept the conventional warfare planners comfortably 
assured in their intelligence estimates and planning matrices.34 Current security 
challenges consist of unpredictable and unconventional threats, motivated by cultural, 
religious, and ethnic differences. This type of unconventional threat is today often called 
“fourth-generation warfare.” Special Operation Forces were designed to fight in this type 
of environment. Their training and skills make them unique and allow them to operate in 
situations where conventional units cannot be used for political or military reasons.35  
No other formations are permanently organized, equipped, and trained for 
foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and 
other highly sensitive missions. In addition, SOF has called on 
unparalleled interagency and international expertise. Their skills offer 
unique, cost-effective, low-profile, and direct as well as indirect measures 
that enhance international stability…36
 
34 Galland, David J. U.S. Special Forces Enter the Intelligence World, 
http://globalspecops.com/sfintel.html - accessed July 27, 2004.  
35 Collins, John M. Special Operations Forces in Peacetime, JFQ/Spring 1999 
36 Ibid. 
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Due to this reason, countries all over the world are developing, or in some cases, 
like Hungary, establishing SOF capability. Hungary does not expect conventional threats 
either in the next decades. However, Hungary, as a member of NATO and European 
Union, has to be able to participate in future, or possibly even present operations. Under 
the current force transformation Hungary wants to establish SOF capability. In this effort 
the United States is willing to help Hungary. Through bilateral agreements between the 
two countries, Hungary will be able to get financial, equipment, and human support. 
Therefore, the author argues that when such reasons as willingness to help, experience, 
and the reputation of the ARSOF are taken into account, Hungary should emulate the 
U.S. ARSOF intelligence architecture. Thus, in this chapter, the ARSOF intelligence 
system will be examined in order to get a clear picture of what Hungary can or can’t 
acquire and apply to its own structure. 
B. ‘WAR IN THE INFORMATION AGE’: THE ROLE OF SOF IN 
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE 
“Special Operation Forces (SOF) are elite, specialized military units that can be 
inserted “behind the lines” through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, 
many of them clandestine.”37 Knowing their areas of responsibility (AORs), their ability 
to work closely with indigenous forces and other institutions gives SOF an advantage 
over conventional forces in operations that demand cultural awareness and special 
intelligence information.38 The success of these missions, clandestine direct-actions 
aimed at capturing or killing specific individuals or groups, depends, to a large degree, on 
having timely, high-quality intelligence about the targets.39  
Because of the importance of highly accurate information in asymmetric warfare, 
SOF intelligence is also under transformation. The SOF already has a far more robust and 
independent role in intelligence and undercover operations. In addition, their numbers, 
deployments, and funding were recently increased. “A robust cadre of humint [human 
 
37 Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report for Congress, October 15, 2001 
38 Collins, John M. Special Operations Forces in Peacetime, JFQ/Spring 1999 
39 Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report, October 15, 2001 
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intelligence] forces organic to SOF [Special Operation Forces] would give us perhaps the 
most important aspect of operations-intelligence fusion that one could get in the field, in 
direct support of counter terror.”40 The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is 
already getting more authority under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the GWOT. 
The war in Iraq, for example, exposed the insufficient personnel problem. In the next five 
years, SOCOM wants to add 4,000 people to the SOF. This personnel increase includes 
Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs soldiers, and a new Marine Special 
Operation unit.41 In addition, the command in Tampa, Florida is expanding its 
intelligence capabilities and adding 700 people to its US and overseas regional 
headquarters to analyze the information gathered by SOF, CIA agents, spy satellites, and 
other means. Based on the analyzed information, they also plan Special Operations-led 
missions. “The nexus of the effort is a new Center for Special Operations, a ‘warfighting 
hub’ with the sole responsibility for ‘planning, supporting, and executing Special 
Operations in the war on terrorism.’”42 There is another way of expanding SOF 
intelligence capabilities, which involves strengthening the cooperation with foreign 
counterparts. “Intelligence-sharing agreements are also in the works between the 
Pentagon and close allies, says Thomas O’Connell Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict. We are pushing very hard…starting with 
the UK, Australia, and others, to get them access to the Sipernet [classified internet], 
break down these barriers, and we will start seeing the type of access and exchange that 
we need.”43 Besides this cooperation at the operation level, US SOF at the tactical level 
will be stationed overseas for longer rotations in order to achieve stronger bonds with 
foreign counterparts and to gain better local access. This goal was based on the “street-
level intelligence-gathering skills” that were demonstrated by SOF in Iraq and 
 
40 Tyson, Ann Scott. Boots on the Ground, Now Also The Eyes Special Operations Forces are doing 
more intelligence gathering in terror war, quoted from: Lt.Gen. Norton Schwartz, director of operations for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, www.globalspecops.com/boots.html - accessed July 27, 2004. 
41 Tyson, Ann Scott. Boots on the Ground, Now Also The Eyes Special Operations Forces are doing 
more intelligence gathering in terror war, quoted from: Lt.Gen. Norton Schwartz, director of operations for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, www.globalspecops.com/boots.html - accessed July 27, 2004. 
42 Ibid. The author quoted from Gen. Bryan “Doug” Brown SOCOM’s commander. 
43 Ibid. 
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Afghanistan. “They’ve developed their own intelligence networks. They’ve gone out, 
they’ve grabbed people, and they’ve effectively shut down a tremendous portion of the 
problem that exists today, O’Connell argues.”44 Special Operations Forces gathering 
human intelligence may be as vital to defeating terrorists, as are combat skills.  
In regards to the situation in Hungary, obviously there are certain steps that have 
to be completed before we start thinking about cooperation at this kind of operation level. 
However, even these first steps in establishing the SOF capability should include the 
foundation of the final goal. This includes integration at higher levels of cooperation and 
access to resources such as the Sipernet, which will provide valuable contributions to the 
GWOT. Among officers who had access to the Sipernet while serving at the operation 
level in Iraq, such as the MNDCS G2 staff or the National Intelligence Cell (NIC), many 
have claimed that this type of access had tremendous benefits. This would be especially 
useful if Hungary wants to have SOF capability like the U.S. ARSOF. It would also 
enhance the interoperability of the unit.  
Yet, before the establishment of the operation level capability, we should first 
focus on the tactical level capability. The next part of the chapter will be devoted to the 
intelligence architecture of the U.S. ARSOF or, as they are more generally called, the 
“Green Berets.” The FM 3-05.20 introduces the Special Forces as a unit that, along with 
other special operation forces, “conducts special operations (SO) across the operational 
continuum. SO are actions that specially organized, trained, and equipped military and 
paramilitary forces take to achieve military, political, economic, or informational 
objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 





44 Tyson, Ann Scott. Boots on the Ground, Now Also The Eyes Special Operations Forces are doing 
more intelligence gathering in terror war, quoted from: Lt.Gen. Norton Schwartz, director of operations for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, www.globalspecops.com/boots.html - accessed July 27, 2004. Quote from 
Thomas O’Connell, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. 
45 FM 3-05.20 Chapter I. 1-1 pp. 
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C. INTELLIGENCE WITHIN ARSOF 
FM 34-36 discusses the role of intelligence within Army Special Operations 
Forces (ARSOF), and focuses on the missions and functions of the intelligence elements 
and organizations that provide all of the necessary intelligence and electronic support to 
ARSOF. The manual is especially important for the SOF S2s, military intelligence 
commanders, and other intelligence elements that support them. ARSOF includes Special 
Forces (SF), Rangers, Special Operations Aviation (SOA), Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) units, and Civil Affairs (CA) units (for CONUS ARSOF organizational chart 
see Appendix B). The ARSOF commanders primarily use the Intelligence and Electronic 
Warfare (IEW) system to achieve the desired goal of the operation. The IEW system 
includes virtually every individual soldier and operational element at every level of 
command.  It is capable of collecting and processing information, disseminating 
intelligence, providing CI support, and managing or executing EW operations. Although 
the system’s resources are connected with other resources from higher and lower levels, 
the system is integrated and independent. Every echelon focuses on different intelligence 
information and adds different intelligence data.46 Within the ARSOF, the IEW system 
also provides intelligence support from the national level down to the tactical soldier in 
the field.  
However, the information in asymmetric warfare is completely different in its 
nature from the information needed by conventional forces. Furthermore, the information 
required by the ‘Green Berets’ is different from information required by other ARSOF 
units (see Appendix C). 
In addition to their general missions, SOF can also conduct collateral activities, 
such as humanitarian assistance, security assistance, search and rescue, counter-drugs, 
antiterrorism, and other security and special activities. There is no question that the 
effective execution of these missions depends on an accurate, detailed, and timely 
intelligence. Furthermore, each of these missions has its own intelligence requirement 
that is unique from the other, and completely different from a conventional force 
 
46 FM 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, retrieved 
December 2004 from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/toc.htm  
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intelligence requirement.47 Therefore, an organic IEW support is crucial to execute the 
infiltration, exfiltration, survival, and mission successfully in any kind of hostile 
environment. Intelligence assets organic to SF are organized according to operational and 
analytical needs. IEW assets are located at the group, battalion, company, and operational 
detachment – A (ODA) levels. Each intelligence asset has its own missions, functions, 
and limitations.48 Hungary does not have an IEW type resources system. At the 
establishment of SOF capability, it would be an urgent need to develop a similar 
resources center, at least, for the SOF structure. 
At the tactical level, it is imperative that the group S2 officer gets timely and 
accurate intelligence information (Appendix D shows the intelligence database for 
ARSOF). Depending on the commander’s orders, the S2 sets up the intelligence 
collection missions and tasks subordinate elements along with the organic and support MI 
units. In the group S2 section, there can be found an S2, assistant S2, SSO, SF technician, 
senior NCO, and other NCOs for operations, intelligence, C-SIGINT, imagery analysis, 
and intelligence analysis (see Appendix E for SOF mission planning).  
The next level is the battalion level; the battalion S2 is responsible for intelligence 
and counterintelligence (see Appendix F to see MI detachment to SF battalion). The tasks 
are similar to the group S2, as the battalion S2 also provides special security 
representative support for the battalion. The S2 section includes the S2 officer, a senior 
intelligence NCO, an intelligence analyst sergeant, and a junior intelligence NCO.  
At the company level, the operations warrant officer is responsible for all issues 
of the organization, training, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities within the 
unit. He is not only responsible for the intelligence training of the unit, but he is also the 
senior warrant officer advisor to the company commander for intelligence related issues. 
 
47 FM 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, retrieved 
December 2004 from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/toc.htm. Chapter I (The Intelligence 
Cycle) 
48 FM 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, retrieved 
December 2004 from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/toc.htm. Chapter II (Intelligence and 
Electronic Warfare Support) 
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The base of the SF is the twelve-man team of the Special Forces Operational 
Detachment Alpha (SFODA). All other organizations within the SF build up to 
command, control, and support the A team. The A team is the base of the Special Forces. 
The reason is that the SFODA, as it was defined earlier, is designed to organize, equip, 
train, advise, direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces engaged in 
UW or FID activities (see Appendix G for the structure of SFODA).49 The commanding 
officer of the team is a captain. His major assistants are the assistant detachment 
commander, a warrant officer, and an operation sergeant who is usually a master 
sergeant. The team has one assistant operations and intelligence sergeant and two of each 
specialist, such as weapons, engineering, medical, and communications. The reason for 
having two of each specialty is to allow the team to operate as a split-team if the 
circumstances are required.  
For all the intelligence aspects of the A team, and during deployment of the 
indigenous forces, the assistant operation and intelligence sergeant is responsible. His 
duty is clearly defined:  
In garrison, he plans, coordinates, and conducts continuous collection 
planning and intelligence analysis in support of the detachment’s area 
study and intelligence reference files effort. During the mission planning, 
he analyzes the detachment mission and evaluates the unit intelligence 
database. The intent of this analysis and evaluation is to identify 
intelligence gaps and to conduct a detailed IPB in support of the 
development of the plan of execution (POE). The assistant operations and 
intelligence sergeant also requests imagery, maps, weather information, 
topographic terrain analysis products, and intelligence updates from the 
battalion S2.50
In addition to the organic IEW support, there are also non-organic IEW supports 
to the Special Forces (see Appendix H for IEW structure). These could include support 
from higher headquarters, HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, or TECHINT support. It could 
also cover the support from Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, as well as 
support from other intelligence services. The support with other intelligence products 
 
49 FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operational Detachment A, pp. 3-29 
50 FM 3-05.20, Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, pp. 3-31 
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means, for example, that each SF group and battalion has a continuously updated DIA 
account, which guarantees the automatic distribution of the intelligence information, 
reports, or studies depending on the unit requirements. 
D. HUNGARIAN CONSTRAINTS 
No doubt that the development of these systems and organizations cannot be 
completed overnight. Furthermore, there is no need to develop everything that the 
ARSOF structure includes because each country’s national interests and operational 
requirements are completely different. The United States is a world power and its 
national interests should be protected all over the world. Meanwhile in Hungary, the 
initial goals are to establish SOF capability that meets with NATO and EU requirements, 
provide a stable base to the contribution in the GWOT, and, of course, serve the national 
interests. Certain elements, however, have indispensable roles within special 
organizations that are vital right from the beginning, thus Hungary should plan with these 
factors in mind. These elements are, for example, the IEW system or the non-organic 
support of the SOF. In order to achieve a properly prepared and trained SOF unit in 
Hungary, we should also establish a central intelligence resource that can directly support 
every level within the SOF. Second, among the non-organic elements, the author believes 
the most important is the support from the intelligence services, as it has been shown that 
the cooperation between the SOF and the CIA or other intelligence services (in the case 
of the United States) is the key for asymmetric warfare. The establishment of a similar 
cooperation in Hungary should be achieved as well. Nonetheless, to have access to the 
Sipernet also has enormous benefits, not only for the SOF structure, but also for the 
country itself. Hungary, based on its geographical location, is a transit country for 
organized crime as well as for terrorists. In addition, because of our support of the United 
States in Iraq and Afghanistan, it could easily be a target country in the future, as it has 
already had signs of this in the present. The effective responses for the current security 
challenges should include the pursuit of information dominance and the development of 
specially trained military and paramilitary units. The establishment of SOF capability, as 
well as a proper intelligence architecture within the structure, in Hungary are vital. In the 
next chapter, the author will recommend one possible idea of how the intelligence 
architecture should look in the Hungarian SOF. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
ARCHITECTURE WITHIN THE HUNGARIAN SOF STRUCTURE 
A. WORKING WITHIN THE NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the role of intelligence inside the SOF units is 
crucial. In addition, we could see that as a response to the current challenges, this role is 
both increasing and changing. 
Moving into an area of clandestine activity that has traditionally been the 
domain of the CIA, the Pentagon has secured new authority that allows 
American special operations forces to dole out millions of dollars in cash, 
equipment and weapons to international warlords and foreign fighters. 
Under the new policy, the U.S. Special Operations Command will have as 
much as $25 million a year to spend providing support to foreign forces, 
irregular forces, groups or individuals aiding U.S. efforts against terrorists 
and other targets. Previously, military units were prohibited from 
providing money or arms to foreign groups.51 
In Hungary, the problem is two-fold: at first we have to establish a SOF 
capability, yet right away we have to adjust it to the requirements of the current 
challenges. In this chapter, the author recommends one possible solution for the 
intelligence architecture within the SOF structure in Hungary. 
The complete copying of the US system is impossible for the Hungarian Special 
Force because of size, capabilities, and budget differences. Nevertheless, to be able to 
answer the current security challenges, Hungary’s SOF structure also needs a competitive 
intelligence architecture that is integrated into the national intelligence community and 
works closely with them in the war on terror. 
B. TACTICAL/SFODA LEVEL 
To start at the unit level, one can understand easily how every chain in the system 
connects to each other and for what purposes. The structure of each Special Force 
element is almost the same as the structure within the U.S. Army Special Forces. An 
article on the website of the Ministry of Defense in Hungary, states that: “The special 
 
51 Miller, Greg. Special Forces Enter CIA Territory With a New Weapon: The Pentagon gains the 
power to let elite troops give millions in cash or arms to foreign fighters. Retrieved December 2004 from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2004/1031neweapon.htm  
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operational battalion will be prepared to fight non-conventional and anti-terrorist combat. 
The force possessing unique arms and equipment will be able to perform special recce 
[reconnaissance] tasks in the areas of operations as well as to carry out direct 
interventions. The US Special Forces are to help it in its preparation by providing the 
logistical background besides assistance in training and methodology.”52
To follow a logical sequence, first the lowest unit level of Special Forces, which 
is the Operational Detachment Alpha or A-team, will be examined from the Hungarian 
perspective. At the team level, the only difference between the U.S. and Hungarian teams 
is that the second in command is a first lieutenant. In both instances, the captain is of 
course the team leader. According to the draft structure, there is also one intelligence 
NCO whose rank is E-8 or E-7. To have the proper and current information at the lowest 
unit level is very important. As CW3 Jeffrey L. Hasler wrote in his article: 
The enemy is not conveniently in front of you on the other side of a 
traceable line. The enemy (and potential friends) can be anywhere. Death 
(or support) can come from any direction. You can’t always rely on 
waiting for the latest information from “Higher.” You may have to react to 
events in your small unit’s individual reality. If you value the success of 
your unit’s mission, your life, and those of your comrades, you had better 
be as informed about that threat environment as you can.53
In the United States, the Special Forces groups concentrate on their own specific 
area. Therefore, at the team level, the intelligence NCO has to focus only on a certain 
operational area along with all the other intelligence NCOs within the SF group. In 
Hungary, most probably only one battalion will be established. Nevertheless, to educate 
individual Hungarian SOF soldiers in regional matters would give operational flexibility 
to the unit.  
 
 
52 Special Operation Battalion, this article available on the website of the Ministry of Defense 
http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=14943&next=120&archiv=1&next=120 accessed December 
2004 
53 Hasler, Jeffrey L. CW3. A Self-Directed Program For Survival: The Use of Open-Source Material 
in Preparation for Deployment to Unusual Places, yet unpublished article, Monterey, 2004 The author, 
Hasler is a Special Forces Warrant Officer with several years serving as an intelligence NCO and as a 
second commanding officer in an A -team 
Based on the Hungarian National Security Strategy and National Military 
Strategy, the current examined security environment, and possible areas for deployment 
for NATO forces, there are three strategic areas that have to be covered. These are the 
Middle East, Europe, and East Africa. 
 
Figure 1. The SOF Tasks Based on Strategic Environment 
 
In this case, the three areas of responsibility (AOR) can be divided among the 
three companies and the teams within each company can focus on only one AOR. At 
team level, the intelligence NCO has to know his AOR on a very high and detailed level. 
He has to speak the language, know the culture, religions, and customs. He also has to be 
able to inform and educate his team members. Because achieving this kind of 
preparedness takes time, building up this capability should be among the first steps for 
Hungary. To keep the team focused, it is very important not only mentally, but also 
operationally, that in an ideal situation the team will be prepared with the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP), for a certain AOR. The logistical questions  
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of how and from where to gain this information are of paramount importance. This is 
especially true because the plan calls of the battalion to be combat ready at the end of 
2010. The original plan states that the first company will be combat ready by the end of 
2007 and that the battalion will consist of two companies. Thus, to plan first only with 
one company and its intelligence capability is both reasonable and prudent. 
Not to be specific on the other side is also unacceptable, as a “Jack for all trades, 
master of none” is not a solution. The author’s recommendation is to keep the A-team 
NCOs focusing on one part of the world and let the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and 
his team keep their eye on the broader world. The question of how this should be 
executed on a day-by-day basis is our next focus. 
Based on the direction of the Hungarian National Security and Defense Strategy, 
the current examined security environment, and the NATO’s forces possible areas for 
deployment, one or two “hot spots” must be designated for the Special Force. Looking at 
the present political and security situations, the Middle East will be a likely source of 
problems. For example, at the team level, the intelligence NCOs will have to be experts 
on both Afghanistan and Iraq. They will have to speak the language, know the culture, 
behaviors, and customs, and they must be able to inform and teach their team members. 
To keep the team’s focus is very important not only mentally, but they will also have to 
be prepared with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for certain areas. It would be 
impossible to expect the teams to be familiar with the whole world in addition to their 
other trainings. The author believes, especially at the beginning, that the Hungarian SF 
battalion should take more care about their combat readiness and less focus on the 
intelligence aspects. There should be a certain amount of time set aside before 
deployment, and during this time, it should be possible to prepare the team for the 
necessary cultural and local information about the target area. Yet, again, these 
recommendations are only for the initiation phase. Of course, the final goal is to achieve 
a high language and cultural readiness simultaneously with the other aspects of their 
trainings. From how and where to gain the needed information about the target area is our 
next area of concern. 
 29
                                                
In his article, Hasler points out the difference between intelligence and 
information and talks about the importance of personal initiative. He states that, 
“information which is properly evaluated, classified, and disseminated by intelligence 
professionals is intelligence…Although not necessarily intelligence information that 
helps you avoid making culturally-derived mistakes, and enhances your understanding of 
the environment may be life-saving. You must appreciate that unit information available 
on the prospective AO, and you must take the initiative to gather much of it yourself.”54 
In agreement with Hasler, there is certainly useful and necessary information coming 
from the company and battalion intelligence officers and from higher-level intelligence 
organizations. The individual level, however, is also very important. First, for the 
intelligence NCO position in the team, a person should be selected who has an interest in 
different cultures, history, and geography. Here the person’s initiative becomes very 
important, as a person who is very interested in his specialty could find that his job could 
also be his hobby. To be an expert on a country or on an AOR takes a lot of time. This is 
time, specifically out of office time, that the person would have to spend to keep himself 
up-to-date on the target area’s political, economic, and military situation, currently, in the 
past, as well as perspectives for the future. The person also has to be familiar with the 
traditions, customs, and family or tribal bonds of the area. Everyone can see that this is 
infeasible to do within office or duty hours in addition to the completing one’s regular 
training. As Hasler says, information is disseminated to the team intelligence NCO from 
the company and battalion intelligence officers; however, to have a central source for the 
teams is absolutely necessary. Here, it can be important to have a source similar to the US 
IEW system; likewise, access to the Sipernet, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
could offer an important research tool. At the initial stage, it may be enough to have a 
couple computers with high-speed internet in a separate room where the NCOs can print 
out information, file it, and then organize the information according to countries and 
topics. In this way, information is up-to-date, while researchers can interact with each 
 
54 Hasler, Jeffrey L. CW3. A Self-Directed Program For Survival: The Use of Open-Source Material 
in Preparation for Deployment to Unusual Places, yet unpublished article, Monterey, 2004 The author, 
Hasler is a Special Forces Warrant Officer with several years serving as an intelligence NCO and as a 
second commanding officer in an A -team. 
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other in order to maintain a broader knowledge. In addition, they can analyze information 
together and come to conclusions regarding future trends, which they should be able to 
report to the battalion S2 via the company intelligence NCO. Yet again, it has to be 
stressed that this type of information gathering is independent from the regular 
Information Preparation for Battlefield (IPB). Before deployment, the necessary 
information regarding the mission comes from the battalion S2 officer. This information 
collection can be just an extra; however, as Hasler states, sometimes it can save the 
team’s life in the field. 
C. COMPANY LEVEL 
The company HQ or SFODB is a very important level within the SF structure in 
the United States. That is a multipurpose C2 element and can cover from one to six 
SFODAs. The FM 3-05.20 states its primary missions are: “to act as an advanced 
operational base (AOB), a SOCCE, or an isolation facility (ISOFAC)…The SFODB can 
also deploy to conduct SF operations in a specified AO or JSOA.”55 In Hungary the 
significance of the company level is also very important considering the country’s budget 
and deployment capability. Since the company level will be deployed quite frequently, it 
is going to be responsible with all the C2 and intelligence tasks for the teams. In the SF 
Company Headquarters (HQ), according to the draft structural plan, will be assigned one 
operation officer (O2) and four operation NCOs. One of the operation NCOs has the 
responsibility for dealing with intelligence issues. As was examined previously, three 
target areas can be assigned to the SF in Hungary. One per each company, thus in the 
case of the company level intelligence NCO, he can be assigned one area and gather as 
well as disseminate information within the company or, in some cases, within the 
battalion. He has to cooperate and coordinate intelligence tasks through the designated 
channels. Using these channels, he has to be prepared to deal with other national or 
foreign intelligence organizations or military intelligence personnel when the company is 




55 FM 3-05.20 Chapter III (Special Forces Organization) 
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D. BATTALION LEVEL 
The intelligence team in the battalion staff has enormous intelligence 
responsibilities. They have responsibilities to manage all of the intelligence requests and 
requirements for the battalion. The planned number of intelligence personnel in the 
battalion is four. Besides the chief S2 officer, who is a major, are assigned a captain as an 
intelligence officer, an intelligence NCO, and a geo specialist NCO. As opposed to the 
team and company levels, which should be area specific, the battalion S2 and its team 
should cover all the possible areas where the unit could be deployed. Concerning these 
areas, the S2 team has to have the most updated open and classified information with the 
analyzed future and possible outcomes of certain issues that could influence the unit’s 
activities. At present, the number of the S2 personnel is not sufficient to achieve this 
objective. The ideal would be four or five area specialists who could focus on certain 
parts of the world, collect and analyze the available information (open or classified) about 
the area, and be prepared to disseminate information to the teams if and when they have 
to be deployed there. They must be able to set up the AOR specific information requests 
that can go to the intelligence agencies (civilian as well as military) via the S2 officer and 
through the intelligence channels. The primary goal for the battalion is to have its own 
updated information database for all possible missions conducted by the unit.  
E. STRATEGIC LEVEL 
Above the battalion level should be some type of Special Operations Forces 
Command, similar to the SOCOM in the United States. During the start-up phase of this 
program, this responsibility will be assigned to the Joint Special Forces Capability 
Planning Group (JSFCPG), which should be ready for operations in early 2005. 
Foremost, this joint group will be a bridge that connects all the organizations at every 
level that have a role in the establishment of the SOF capability in Hungary. Its missions 
and connections in Hungary are outlined in the next chart. 
 Figure 2 Connections to JSFCPG in Hungary 
 
It also includes the U.S. component represented by the Office of Defense 
Cooperation (ODC). The ODC is responsible for all the financial, equipment, and human 
support that comes from the United States. The Hungarian components include all of the 
National Intelligence Services, the Joint Operational Center (JOC), the Joint Logistics 
Center (JLC), the Strategic Defense Research Institute (SDRI), the Ministry of Defense, 
the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obviously, the group’s main 
task will be to cooperate with these elements and coordinate the cooperation amongst 
these elements. The group and their partners are shown in the next chart. 
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 Figure 3. Connections to the JSFCPG 
 
The final goal is to develop this group into a SOCOM type organization. The 
main task of the group, and later the command, will be to represent the SF unit at the 
strategic and decision making level in order to coordinate the cooperation between the 
unit and the intelligence services in Hungary and abroad in the GWOT. 
In Linda Robinson’s book Masters of Chaos, one can read that the Army Special 
Forces are an essential element in the defense of the United States in the war on terror. 
Their role can be found in both overt and covert operations. Their capabilities and skills 
in low-visibility, clandestine missions in America’s interest are indispensable. In the case 
of Hungary, a final goal after the achievement of the SF unit’s combat readiness is to 
integrate it into the National Intelligence Community through the designated channels. 
The existence of such a unit in Hungary should not be seen as another rival organization 
within the intelligence community. The cooperation between the unit and other 
organizations could be the basis of Hungary’s contribution to the war on terror.  
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When Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs met with Secretary of State 
Colin Powell in Budapest, he declared that, “We are allies in the fight against 
international terrorism, and I believe we shall also be allies in supporting democratic 
tendencies around the world, because this is what really prevents terrorism.”56  
There is no doubt, however, that fighting against terrorism is only possible with 
an effective information network. This network is found not only inside the country, but 
also outside, through international cooperation. The SF battalion in Hungary will be able 
to contribute greatly to what Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has stated. It can participate 
in the military aspects of the GWOT, and build democracies if it receives the mission and 
trust from the government and military leadership. It will be able to work together with 
not only the Military Intelligence Bureau, but also all of the other intelligence 
organizations in Hungary and of NATO. Based on their special capabilities, SOF 
battalion can exchange information on a daily basis with these organizations. 
In conclusion, the intelligence architecture within a Special Forces structure is one 
of its most important components. In a constantly changing security environment, if one 
can be well informed and prepared, one can achieve victory over the enemy. The enemy 
in this era has many faces and fights in an unconventional manner; the response, 
therefore, cannot be achieved conventionally. Currently only the Special Force units are 
able to fight effectively within this modern battlefield. Intelligence has much more value 
now; this is especially true of human intelligence, which has received more attention after 
the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences. The purpose of the SF unit in Hungary has been 
defined and building an effective intelligence structure is a long process, yet the first 
phase of this process has to be initiated if we are to be prepared for the modern 
battlefield.  
However, as it was already mentioned in a previous chapter, SOF represents 
HUMINT on the ground and for this reason depends heavily on sensitive national 
intelligence. Furthermore, it should be fully integrated into the national intelligence 
community as an information user and provider. In the last part of this chapter I will 
 
56 http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Kulugyminiszterium/EN/Archives/New_Site/News/040727_Kovacs-
Powell.htm accessed November 18, 2004 
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introduce the intelligence community in Hungary, briefly analyze the community’s role at 
the national level as well as in the GWOT. Finally yet importantly, I will highlight some 
possible chokepoints that could have an influence on this integration process as well as 
on a daily routine between SOF and the intelligence services in Hungary. 
F. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN HUNGARY 
The current composition and role of the intelligence services was defined by the 
Act No. CXXV, in 1995. “The general mission of the security services is the protection 
of the national security interests of the Hungarian Republic by performing tasks defined 
by the law of the constitutional democracy.”57 The protection of Hungarian national 
security is defined in a comprehensive way: 
• The detection of efforts to attack the independence and territorial integrity 
of the country,  
• The detection and prevention of clandestine efforts which may injure or 
threaten the political, economic and military or defense interests of the 
country, 
•  The acquisition of information about foreign countries or information of 
foreign origin that is important for governmental decisions,  
• The detection and prevention of clandestine efforts to change or disturb 
through unlawful means the constitutional order that ensures basic human 
rights, the multi-party representative democracy and the functioning of 
constitutional institutions,  
• Detecting and preventing terrorist acts, illegal weapon and drug 
trafficking, and illegal traffic in internationally controlled goods and 
technologies.58  
This Act defines five security services in Hungary as well (see Appendix A).  
These are the following: 
• Intelligence Bureau (IB) 
• National Security Bureau (NSB) 
• Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) 
• Military Security Bureau (MSB) 
 
57 Babos, Tibor. Vision of a New Hungarian Intelligence Architecture, GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) WORKING PAPER – NO. 136, Geneva, 
March 2004 
58 Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 1995), § 3-8. 
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• Special Service for National Security (SSNS) 
The five services can be separated into two main groups. Under the “civil national 
security services” can be found the IB, NSB, SSNS, and the MIB.  The MSB belongs 
within the “military national security services.” The role of these services in the GWOT 
is vital. Hungary has devoted herself to democratic ideas and denouncing terrorism. 
Hungary’s Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, André Erdõs, stated that: 
“The barbaric acts of September 11 have proven with elementary force that, in fact, 
terrorism knows no boundaries (…) their act is an attack against all we stand for, we 
believe in, against the very foundations of our civilizations.”59
Hungary’s role in the GWOT is best defined by the National Security Strategy. 
Hungary believes that the solution can be found within enhanced bilateral and regional 
cooperation, joining forces on a broad international level and the coordinated action of 
international organizations. “The fight against terrorism requires an integrated approach 
that should include, inter alia, means of prevention and intervention, joint international 
efforts aimed at eliminating the material basis of terrorism, and the protection of critical 
infrastructure.”60
Hungary’s determination in the GWOT, relative to the vital part of the 
intelligence services, did not start out after 9/11. As a consequence of the terror attacks in 
the mid 90’s, in 1998, Hungary and the United States developed a comprehensive plan to 
attack international organized crime and terrorism in Central Europe. Money laundering 
was also a significant problem in the country. In order to solve that problem Hungary 
endorsed the Act on Aggravation of the Provisions for Fighting Against Terrorism and 
for the Prevention of Money Laundering and on the Establishment of Restricting 
Measures on 27 November 2001. 
Aware of the significance of regional and international co-operation: 
Hungary has concluded a set of bilateral treaties on terrorism with twenty-
eight States, including most of its neighbors. In 1996, Hungary acceded to 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in the 
 
59 Agenda Item 166 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Statement by H.E. Ambassador 
Andre Erdõs, online, www.un.org/terrorism/statemetns/hungaryE.html accessed November 29, 2002. 
60 Hungarian National Security Strategy III.3.1. Terrorism 
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framework of the Council of Europe. Hungary is also party to all of the 
major international conventions pertaining to international terrorism.61
With this in mind, today, one of the most important issues for the Hungarian intelligence 
services is to contribute effectively to the international effort against terrorism. The 
newly established SOF unit in Hungary will also have a large role in the GWOT. Their 
effective co-operation is vital to success at the end. The intelligence services are also 
facing with difficulties that can influence this desired co-operation with SOF. Although, 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to find the solution to these difficulties, the author 
would like to highlight them as a possible problem related to the Hungarian SOF unit’s 
future.  
The first problem can be described with the regime change in 1989 in Hungary. 
As Tibor Babos summarized: 
Before 1989, Hungary’s strategic responsibility was being the first line of 
defense as the most important country of the Warsaw Pact’s southern 
theater…The main target countries therefore, were Western Germany and 
Italy as well as the UK and USA. With the new internal and international 
environment, the whole previous defense and intelligence strategy 
collapsed overnight. The previous doctrines became irrelevant: the target 
countries, the enemies, the controlling authorities, the driving ideas and 
methods, the financial resources, external and internal relations, and the 
goals of these organizations changed as well…Though new services were 
created, they were still based on the previous system. Most people did not 
realize that the Hungarian military and intelligence services, under the 
Warsaw Pact, had virtually the same doctrine and objectives as the USSR, 
which were to defend the Soviet Union first and Hungarian security and 
defense needs only secondarily.62
In addition to this problem, not only the enemy has changed overnight, but the 
‘face of the enemy’ has changed as well. As the National Security Strategy stated, 
Hungary has no conventional threat within the near future. However, terrorism, organized 
crime, regional conflicts are making this security environment less stabile than it was  
 
61 Babos, Tibor, Regulating the intelligence system and oversight in the Hungarian constitutional 
democracy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2003 pp. 25 
62 Babos, pp. 44 
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during the Cold War. At the same time these problems also present completely different 
intelligence requirements. On the top of this SOF have also specific intelligence 
requirements that should be provided by the national intelligence assets. 
To exasperate the problem, Hungary could not easily turn to NATO for a 
solution, because of the fundamental nature of the communist-type 
intelligence services, and the antagonistic former relationship between 
intelligence services of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarian 
services were interested in maintaining their autonomy, while the Western 
services did not trust their Eastern counterparts… the global role of 
intelligence in the more complex international environment and 
multinational (UN, NATO, OSCE and other) operations has 
expanded…The transition process is more complicated for intelligence 
since NATO has no common intelligence system. Hungary was left 
without a model readily to copy and therefore had to create a hybrid 
system combining what they already knew, the old Soviet style, and what 
they were learning about the new Western system. Due to the sensitive 
nature of classified information and compartmentalized data that is 
common to intelligence, information sharing is very cumbersome and 
more difficult compared with other services.63
The problem of the information sharing even among member states in NATO and 
European Union was analyzed in Paper 33 published by the Bonn International Center 
for Conversion regarding especially the role of SOF. “Special Forces rely on sensitive 
national intelligence, which member states are unwilling to pool or share because of 
jealously guarded sources and the risk of compromising such sources.”64  
A final possible problem can occur because SOF is going to be a newly 
established organization in Hungary. Although, the idea of specially trained unit is not 
completely strange to military and political leaders, in this form it is going to be unique at 
first. In the beginning, a lack of understanding regarding the role of SOF can exist. Not 
knowing the needs of SOF, by intelligence or by missions, can cause confusion.  
Nonetheless, the current international security requires specially trained units in 
order to achieve victory. SOF units require an effective, well-organized intelligence  
 
63 Babos, pp. 48 
64 Bonn International Center for Conversion, paper 33: Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force, Options 
for and Constraints on a European Defense Equipment Strategy, retrieved December 2004 from 
http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper33/paper33.pdf
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structure, which can be integrated into national level intelligence. National intelligence 



















































































                                                
V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARIZING THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
After the Soviet Union’s demise and the end of the Cold War, new problems 
emerged. Current experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that a so-called 
“fourth-generation warfare” or asymmetric warfare has developed and become the new 
threat. This new threat, international terrorism, is seriously challenging our global 
security. Terrorism itself is not new; however, it has fundamentally changed in nature. In 
the past, terrorism was used as a bargaining strategy by certain groups and was usually 
only a problem for local authorities. Now it has become an international network with a 
global agenda posing a considerable threat for Western democracies. In contrast, during 
the Cold War, the belligerents were more or less rational.  Today’s enemies, such as 
terrorists, none-state actors, and insurgents are willing to pursue high-risk destructive 
strategies. Thus, traditional diplomacy, deterrence, and coercion may not always be 
effective. Insurgents are fighting unconventionally, in a way that huge conventional 
armies cannot fight effectively against; this is a “war by ambush instead of by combat, by 
infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 
instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.” 65 The U.S. Army Special Forces or so 
called “Green Berets” were designed and trained for unconventional warfare. They have 
proven their skills in wartime as well as in peacetime and have proven their reputation as 
an effective fighting force all around the world. For today’s challenges, they are the 
correct response to today’s changing environment as was proven in Afghanistan. 
Information dominance is one of the key factors in asymmetric warfare, especially 
information gathered by human intelligence. The ARSOF intelligence architecture is a 
mature, technologically advanced system. Nothing proved better in the war in 
Afghanistan than when ARSOF, along with CIA paramilitary units, achieved enormous  
 
65 President John F. Kennedy’s speech at West Point, New York, 1962, the author found this quote in 
the FM 3-05.20 manual at Chapter I 
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success in the first phase of the fighting. Their success, and generally the vast capabilities 
of SOF, led the military and political leaders in the United States to increase the SOF 
personnel for the next five years.  
B. ADVANTAGES OF ORGANIZING SOF CAPABILITY IN HUNGARY 
Besides the United States, countries everywhere have realized the importance of 
the Special Operations Forces capability and have either started to strengthen or in case 
of Hungary, made serious efforts to establish such a force. Hungary’s goal with the SOF 
capability is two-fold. First, as a member of NATO and EU, Hungary has to be able to 
contribute effectively to the future operations of the Alliances. Second, it is in Hungary’s 
own national interests to have specially trained and equipped forces that are able to 
defend the country, yet also designed to deal with the current security challenges. The 
author’s aim with this paper is to recommend the emulation of this intelligence 
architecture within the SOF structure in Hungary. This recommendation is supported by 
three relevant points. First, the ARSOF intelligence has proven effective, and it has built 
a very good reputation all around the world. Second, most of the NATO’s standard 
procedures are based on the U.S. model; therefore, the emulation of this system helps 
Hungary to achieve a better compatibility with other NATO members and supports the 
country’s full integration into the Alliance. The last, yet possibly the most important, is 
that the United States is willing to help and support our effort to establish SOF capability 
in Hungary. This support includes financial, equipment, education, and human resources. 
Human resources is defined as Mobile Military Teams (MTTs) that come to Hungary and 
help in training or contribute to set up the basic principles and doctrines of the Hungarian 
SOF capability. 
The author recommended one possible solution for the intelligence architecture 
within the SOF structure; moreover, the final goal should be the integration of the SOF 
into the National Security Services via designated channels, as both an information user 
and provider. In addition, it should be examined as to what is the best means the SOF in 
Hungary can work with these Security Services.  
The Hungarian National Security Strategy claims that Hungary does not expect 
any conventional attacks in the next decade; small-scale wars, insurgencies, and terrorism 
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are, however, currently presenting major security challenges for Hungary. The 
establishment of SOF capability in the Hungarian Defense Forces is an urgent need. Yet, 
because the role of intelligence within SOF has been increased, Hungary should keep up 
with the current changes by starting to develop intelligence architecture simultaneously 













































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX F. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT 
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